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Since 2006, Mexico has been embedded in a severe humanitarian and social crisis 
brought about by Calderon’s “drug war” security strategy. On March 2011, the 
Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity (MPJD), a social movement of victims was 
created in reaction to the growing death toll of drug related violence, the increase in 
human rights violations and the perception of a systematic effort by the government to 
belittle social costs of the war by manipulating the official narrative. Through protest 
marches, the MPJD articulated spaces of shared victimhood and set the path for victims’ 
pain to be collectivized and politicized. This thesis illustrates how the spatial aspects of 
the official narrative of the drug war are countered by the emotional geographies 
constructed by the MPJD. These “spaces of pain” allowed for distinct emotional 
geographies that capture media attention to motivate collective action setting the 
foundations for reconstructing the social pact.   
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For the last six years, Mexico has experienced a severe humanitarian and social 
crisis brought about by the drug war security strategy implemented by President Felipe 
Calderon. On March 2011, the Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity (MPJD), a 
social movement led by victims emerged in reaction to the growing toll of victims of the 
drug related violence, the increase in human rights violations and the perception of a 
systematic effort by the government to downplay social costs of the war by recrafting the 
official narrative. 
Since the first protests associated with the embryonic stage of the MPJD, the 
people participating in it worked towards enabling diverse processes that allowed for 
increasing recognition of victims of war, challenging the official narrative of victimhood 
constructed by Calderon’s administration. Though the mobilizations and protest started 
as displays of solidarity configuring spaces for consolation, the exchange of 
individualized stories of drug-war-violence associated victimhood, quickly reconfigured 
these spaces, opening spaces of shared victimhood and setting the path for victims’ pain 
to be collectivized and politicized along the way. The creation of these new spaces also 
allowed the MPJD to, by directly challenging the official narrative, put pressure on the 
government to try and enforce a shift in the national security strategy, moving from the 
disembodied idea of ‘state’ security towards a more broadly defined notion of ‘human’ 
security.  
The notion of pain associated with unacknowledged victimhood and lack of 
justice rested at the heart of the MPJD actions of non-violent resistance and protest, 
which included mass mobilizations and “bus caravan tours” through the national territory. 
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These tactics were deployed as means of appropriating public spaces and using 
the appropriation as ways of furthering the recognition and vindication of the narrative of 
the victims’ pain. Since its embryonic stage, the MPJD has challenged the official 
discourse regarding the casualties of the war on drugs, a limited narrative of victimhood 
that spoke only of criminals and collateral damage. The protesters’ response to the 
official narrative heightened emotional reactions of indignation and pain associated with 
an invisible victimhood. For this reason, the efforts of the MPJD were focused on 
humanizing the statistics, collecting the stories of the victims and trying to push forward 
processes that allow the victims to gain both recognition and access to justice.        
The present thesis seeks to illustrate how the MPJD members’ pain associated 
with their victimhood allowed for the opening of spaces of shared victimhood, mobilizing 
individualized stories of pain towards creating a socialized experience of this emotion 
and ultimately founding a new political expression of victimhood. Moreover, it argues that 
the spatial aspect of the official narrative of the drug war, reflected in the geographical 
distribution of the drug violence and the spatial epistemology of the official database on 
the drug related killings, are countered by the emotional geographies constructed by the 
mobilization patterns of the MPJD, allowing the movement to articulate through it a 
counter-narrative of victimhood associated with the drug war and forming the foundation 
for the reconstruction of the social pact in Mexico. 
In order to reach its goal, this thesis explores the case study of the public protest 
events and the first bus caravan associated with the embryonic stage of the MPJD (from 
April 26th to June, 2011), a process that concluded with the signing of the National Pact 
in Juarez, Coahuila. The analysis presented, is informed by the growing literature of the 
subfield of emotional geographies which acknowledges the crucial role that emotions 
play as mediators between society and space. As a final note, the data for this case 
study and the emotional geography analysis were collected through an ethnographic 
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content analysis based on the Mexican weekly news magazine Proceso. This and other 
publications that inform the current thesis are originally in Spanish hence, most of the 
materials have been translated by the author of this paper who is a native Spanish-
speaker.  
Since the current approach to the MPJD demonstrates that its actions articulated 
a counter-narrative to the official discourse of victimhood, the present document is 
structured as follows: An extensive background section explaining the emergence of the 
drug war security strategy, dissecting the rationale behind it, exploring the geographical 
distribution of the drug violence and the elements of the official narrative of drug war 
related victimhood. The following section pertains to the analysis of the subject of study 
as such it briefly introduces the nature of the MPJD, the methodological approach 
applied to obtaining the data, the theoretical foundations informing the analysis and the 
analysis of the three elements conforming the case study. The last section corresponds 
to the concluding reflection about the configuration of spaces of shared victimhood and 
the implications that enabling a transition process from victims to victimhood might have 




II. BACKDROP TO THE MPJD: THE MEXICAN DRUG WAR 
A. The 2006 Election and Calderon’s Quest for Legitimacy  
A considerable number of academics, political analysts and journalists suggest 
that the origins of the Mexican drug war can be traced back to the 2006 electoral 
campaign and the competition that emerged between the candidate for the right, Felipe 
Calderon Hinojosa and his leftist counterpart, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. Perhaps 
the most notable works in this regards, correspond to those of Nuñez Albarrán (2012), 
Flores Nández (2012), Castañeda Gutman & Aguilar Valenzuela (2012) and Wolf, S. 
(2011). In their analysis of the drug war, these authors explore the nature of the electoral 
campaign and the configuration of events that led to the Federal Electoral Tribunal 
decision to concede the election to Felipe Calderon.  
Eight political parties participated in the 2006 presidential election; however five 
of them joined forces in two different electoral coalitions. Because of this, the aggressive 
competition took place only between three candidates: Roberto Madrazo, the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate, in coalition with the Ecologist Green 
Party of Mexico (PVEM); Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, the candidate for the right National 
Action Party (PAN) which occupied the presidency at the moment; and Andres Manuel 
Lopez Obrador, candidate for the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the 
coalition with the other two left political forces Convergence (PC) and the Labor Party 
(PT). Since Madrazo remained third in the polls, the serious competition took place 
between Calderon and Lopez Obrador.  
Castañeda Gutman & Aguilar Valenzuela (2012) and Wolf, S. (2011) point out 
that both candidates’ electoral platforms during the campaign served to establish a 
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common ground for analyzing how far removed the drug-related issue was from 
mainstream political concerns at the time for the election. Calderon campaigned under 
the slogan of the “president of employment” promising to boost economic growth and 
increase the generation of employment opportunities. His promises however, had little 
impact upon the electorate, who had already experienced unfulfilled promises from 
PAN’s president Vicente Fox. Throughout his presidential term, Fox had promised to 
boost employment, improve both education and health standards, and reduce polarizing 
inequality rampant throughout the country. Nonetheless, by the end of his term in office, 
working standards had deteriorated sharply, and both poverty and inequality had 
increased considerably. People were disappointed with what the first “transition” 
government in hands of the PAN and the generalized perception was that the party had 
little probability of remaining in power. (Wolf, 2011, p.685)  
Lopez Obrador on the other hand, used his term as Head of Government of 
Mexico City as a stepping stone towards the presidency, widely showcasing his social 
welfare programs and his infrastructural developments of the city. He was widely popular 
within the federal district of the country and amongst the poorest and most vulnerable 
sectors of Mexican society. His electoral platform promised the implementation of an 
innovative and alternative economic model to replace neo-liberalist pillars of the 
economy founded upon the implementation of wider public policy in benefit of the most 
vulnerable social groups. This promise resonated nationally, positioning him throughout 
most of the campaign up until April, ahead of all the polls. What is clear for these authors 
is that the issue concerning drug trafficking, drug consumption and drug-related violence 
was seldom addressed by either one of the front-runners. Eventually, as the election 
date got closer, Lopez Obrador’s popularity began to decline, making the election one of 
the closest ever in the country.  
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Towards the closing of Election Day on July 2th, 2006, the Federal Electoral 
Institute (IFE) declared that the results of the official quick count were too close to call, 
further announcing that the official count, which would begin on July 5th, was to 
determine which of the two candidates was to be recognized as president elect. 
However, based on exit poll results, both Calderon and Lopez Obrador declared 
themselves winners. In the meantime, the IFE’s tardiness in announcing the final results 
only increased the resonance of claims of a “tainted” or “manipulated” election. By the 
time that the final announcement came, the IFE declared that Calderon had won over 
Lopez Obrador by a narrow margin of 0.6 per cent. On the following weeks, Lopez 
Obrador led major protest through the main avenues of Mexico City, demanding a “vote-
by-vote” general recount. As Castañeda Gutman & Aguilar Valenzuela (2012) and Wolf, 
S. (2011) point out, Calderon would have been able to appease detractors by agreeing 
to the recount, but instead his refusal only exacerbated suspicion as to the legitimacy 
through which he had gained the presidency. In the midst of massive public outrage and 
protest, Lopez Obrador refused to recognize Calderon as legitimate president elect and 
instead proclaimed himself as the legitimate Mexican president later establishing a 
parallel governmental structure.    
By the inauguration ceremony on December 1st, 2006, Calderon’s legitimacy 
was severely compromised and at risk. Ten days into his presidency, he announced the 
drug war strategy and implemented a series of highly visible military operatives. Wolf 
further argues that the media deployment of images of military convoys crossing the 
country gave the impression of a relentless government. However, the public notoriety of 
military operations deemed the newly implemented strategy inefficient. For Wolf, the 
over-emphasis placed on the spectacular aspect of the drug war strategy sought, first 
and foremost, to have an impact over public opinion and consolidate social support for 
the presidency of Calderon. (Wolf, 2011, p.686) 
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B. The Drug War Strategy: Refuting its Foundations 
The rapid implementation of the drug war strategy was officially justified by a 
statement: drug trafficking had become a major threat for the nation, more than what the 
president had been able to perceive before his election. The strategy was needed so 
“the drugs don’t reach your children”. (Wolf, 2011, p.686) Castañeda Gutman & Aguilar 
Valenzuela (2012) and Wolf, S. (2011) point out to three major official reasons given in 
support of the drug war: (1) The tightening of border security after 9/11 made it harder 
for drug traffickers to export their product, making it so that drugs remained and were 
marketed nationally, increasing drug consumption in the country, particularly amongst 
teenage population; (2) There had been a considerable increase of drug-related violence 
which was progressively undermining national security; (3) The rampant corruption had 
allowed for the state to lose control over much of the national territory that had in fact, 
been taken over by the drug cartels. (Wolf, 2011, p.686)  
These authors however, also offer a series of rebuttal arguments projected in the 
official data sets. According to Castañeda Gutman & Aguilar Valenzuela (2012), at the 
time the strategy was announced, Mexico’s drug consumption was relatively low; the 
country was facing the lowest violence rates in its history (only eight murders per 
100,000 persons) and the lowest level of penetration of the drug cartels in governmental 
institutions. Citing the Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography, the 
authors state that the number of killings for 2007 was 8,867 and that by 2011, it had 
risen to 27,199. Therefore, the number of killings per 100,000 persons went from 8.5 in 
2007 to 24 in 2011. Additionally, they affirm that the total number of killings in the first 
five years of the presidency of Calderon totalled of 95, 659. Wolf (2011) provids her own 
account of the official discourse and the officially available data, which reflects the same 
line of thought as the previously referenced authors: According to the National Survey on 
Addictions, the increase of drug consumption amongst Mexican population had been 
8 
 
marginal, and the slight increase was observable within the teenage population; 
consumption in Mexico remained considerably less than that of the United States, 
Western Europe and even other Latin American countries and even though there was an 
increase in consumption, it was more likely attributed to population growth and the 
expansion of the Mexican middle class.  
Perhaps the best comparison between Calderon’s drug war rhetoric and the hard 
data corresponds to that of Nancy Flores Nández (2012). Her analysis masterfully 
articulates an exposé of the official lies through which the government tried to sell the 
idea that the drug war was total and effective. (Flores Nández, 2012, p.19). She carefully 
dissects the so called “successes” of the strategy pointing to the fact that in 2012 it had 
left a toll of more than 50,000 civilian casualties, 3,000 disappeared, 230,000 displaced, 
at least 1,226 minors (in Mexico the legal age is 18) executed and approximately 52,500 
orphans (Flores Nández, 2012, p.173). In the meantime, it had not impacted the drug 
cartels’ profits which oscillate between 18 and 39 billion dollars a year just for sales 
within the United States (Flores Nández, 2012, p.87). Additionally, she points to the 
dangerous implications of having the Mexican Army policing the streets and how the 
militarization can be read as a new “Guerra Sucia” (Dirty War) like that carried out during 
the 1960s and the 1970s between the PRI-ruled government and the left-wing student 
and guerilla groups under the presidencies of Luis Echeverria and Jose Lopez Portillo. 
The drug war created the perfect climate for criminalizing social causes, persecuting and 
repressing social and opposition leaders, activist and journalists. In the meantime, the 
Attorney General’s Office acknowledges that there were only 1,359 arrests with 
demonstrable links to a drug cartel between 2006 and 2010 for crimes against public 
health, out of which 1,194 were processed and 165 were not even prosecuted. This 
number represents only 1.12 per cent of the 121,199 organized crime-related arrests 
reported by Calderon to the Mexican Congress. With these numbers at hand, Flores 
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Nández further suggests that the remaining 119,840 detentions might correspond to 
drug dealers, drug consumers, mules, peasants or even just innocent bystanders. 
(Flores Nández, 2012)    
All these analyses together reinforce the idea that the drug war is more a media 
strategy than an active plan to regulate Mexican organized crime. Calderon’s strategy 
challenged the current global trend of dealing with drug trafficking, which mainly 
proposes giving up the punitive-prohibitionist approach and instead addresses the 
matter from a more holistic perspective focused on public health and institution 
strengthening. Such a strategy would include measures to disrupt money laundering 
networks within both the political and economic sectors, invest in social crime prevention 
strategies and fight political corruption. The bottom line is that Calderon’s strategy limited 
itself to the massive deployment of security forces, both the military and the police, 
without any complementary action seeking to establish a more long-term holistic 
approach towards fighting organized crime.  
Despite the fact that the Mexican public applauded president Calderon’s drug 
war strategy at its initial stage, the rapid and exponential increase of violence throughout 
the territory severely damaged both his image and the social support for his approach 
over the long run. The growing perception of insecurity and the 95-97 per cent rates of 
impunity eventually became catalysts for citizen-led action demanding a change on the 
national security strategy, concerns upon which the MPJD was founded. The “drug 
problem” and the war that came about with it, is now perceived as a self-fulfilled 
prophecy. Its discursive creation to boost president Calderon’s public acceptance rates 
and legitimacy after a questionable election unraveled a reality, that is now forcing all the 
available resources of the country (the Army, the Navy and the Federal Police) to 
mobilize and fight the rampant violence brought about with the exaggeration of the drug 
threat. Castañeda Gutman & Aguilar Valenzuela (2012) support this idea by stating that 
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the shift in the official discourse towards blaming the drug cartels for all the evils that the 
Mexican nation was facing, pushed the cartels to create parallel defense structures. 
Furthermore, the authors express deep concern over the irresponsibility behind 
Calderon’s actions. They also highlight that, despite having all the available elements to 
acknowledge the wrongful strategy and shift his approach towards conflict management, 
Calderon stuck to the unrealistic goal of eliminating the drug cartels, ensuring the 
increase of violence rates throughout the country.    
One of the arguments for the drug war that has not been addressed in this 
section corresponds to that of the competition between the state and the drug cartels 
over the Mexican territory. This issue, along with that of the territorial extension of drug-
related violence will be discussed in the following section. 
 
C. Hell on Earth: The Local Geographies of the Drug War Violence  
The official argument justifying the drug war stated that the drug cartels had 
openly defied the Mexican state through the social intimidation that arose from the 
conflict between them for the control of the drug distribution and trafficking routes 
throughout the country. Whether or not the dimension of this threat was blown out of 
proportions to serve political interests, the truth is that the implementation of the drug 
war strategy has indeed led to unprecedented levels of violence geographically 
dispersed throughout the territory and a generalized perception of insecurity in several 
zones of the country, particularly those closer to the northern border. According to 
security expert, Dr. Edgardo Buscaglia (2012) from the [Mexican] Institute of Citizen 
Action for Justice and Democracy, the patterns of violence in Mexico resemble the 
symptoms faced by fragile and failed states. In his research he claims to have found 982 
small territorial failed state enclaves in Mexico and identified risks for the multiplication 
and extension of these failed state spaces throughout the country. The continuity of such 
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a trend could rapidly reconfigure the structure of governance bringing about a national 
reality that would be compatible with those Afghanistan or Pakistan. He points to zones, 
like the municipalities of Mezquital, Guanasevi and Cienega in the state of Durango 
where the absence of state is total and the organized crime has replaced state authority, 
extorting and even charging taxes through a fiscal roll including business owners. 
(Buscaglia, 2012)    
In 2013, the Trans-Border Institute’s Justice in Mexico Project published its Drug 
Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012 Report in which amongst other 
issues concerning Mexican reality, the researchers of this institution explored the shifting 
geographic patterns of violence using data on homicides and organized crime-related 
homicides available at the municipal and state levels. According to their data, while the 
“distribution of homicides has grown over the last several years it appears to have 
receded somewhat in 2012=Also, new local centers of violence have emerged, though 
not at the levels of intensity previously seen elsewhere.” (Molzahn, C., Rodriguez 
Ferreira, O., & Shirk, D. A., 2013) The report summarizes the following: (1) the 
geographical distribution of the overall homicides; (2) the distribution of organized crime-
style homicides; and (3) the new local centers of violence. Some of this data is 
reproduced and analyzed bellow.  
(1) Geographical Distribution of Overall Homicides- According to the report:  
=at the outset of the Calderon administration, in 2007, there were 1,875 
municipalities with no reported homicides, but the number of municipalities free 
of such violence diminished more than 28 per cent to 1,337 by 2011. Meanwhile, 
the number of municipalities with 25 or more annual homicides grew from 50 in 
2007 to 240 in 2011. This geographic dispersion of violence=has been attributed 
mainly to the proliferation of conflicts and internal disputes among drug-trafficking 
organizations. In 2012=the proportion of municipalities free from violence 
increased 16 per cent to at least 1,556 and the number with more than 25 
homicides decreased more than 25 per cent to 178. (Molzahn, C., Rodriguez 




=the worst violence has remained concentrated in fewer than 10 per cent of 
Mexico’s 2,457 municipalities. During the first three years of the Calderon 
administration, the primary locations affected by this violence were found in the 
northwest (in the states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua and Sinaloa) and 
along the southern Pacific coast (in the states of Michoacan and Guerrero). Over 
the last three years, elevated levels of homicide continued in these areas but 
also spread to Mexico’s northeast and, to a lesser extent, the southeast. 
(Molzahn, C., Rodriguez Ferreira, O., & Shirk, D. A., 2013, p.20)  
 
 
(2) Distribution of Organized Crime-Style Homicides- Facing the fact that the 
officially reported municipal-level data for these type of violence has not been made 
available by the Mexican National Security System (SNSP) since September 2011, the 
reporting done by the Trans-Border Institute’s Justice in Mexico Project focuses its 
discussion on this matter on the available data at the state level, referencing two major 
national newspapers (Reforma and Milenio):  
..in 2012, Reforma reported a total of 9,746 executions, a roughly 21 per cent 
reduction compared with the 11,631 reported for the same period the year 
before=there is a significant correlation between increases in overall homicides 
and the number of [organized crime-style] homicides identified by news-media 
organizations=[I]n 2012, drug-trafficking- and organized-crime style homicides 
were most concentrated in the central and eastern border regions, as well as in 
central Pacific coast states on the mainland. According to Reforma’s data, from 
January through November 2012, five states—Sinaloa (1,077), Chihuahua 
(1,049), Nuevo León (1,190), Guerrero (925), and Coahuila (735)—accounted for 
over half of organized-crime-style killings nationwide. Milenio’s tallies for the top 
five states differed: Chihuahua (2,137), Guerrero (1,408), Sinaloa (1,089), Nuevo 
León (1,014), and Coahuila (775). Except for Chihuahua and Guerrero, there is a 
close correlation between the estimates of 24 Reforma and Milenio. Again, it is 
unclear why Milenio’s estimates are so much higher in Chihuahua and 
Guerrero=These states host major drug transit routes, and organized-crime 
groups have been active in these areas for many years. (Molzahn, C., Rodriguez 
Ferreira, O., & Shirk, D. A., 2013, p.22-24)  
 
 (3) New Local Centers of Violence: Regarding the shift of the localized centers 
of violence, this assessment estimates that Juarez, which in 2010 was titled the most 
murderous municipality on the planet, with more than 3,000 homicides in a city of 1.3 
million, a worse per capita rate than Kandahar, Caracas or Baghdad (International Crisis 
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Group, 2013, p.34), by the end of 2012 had been markedly transformed changing the 
dynamics and patterns of violence, positioning Acapulco at the top:  
From 2008 through 2011, the largest share of violence was concentrated in 
Juarez. When the violence hit its peak there in 2010, Juarez accounted for more 
than one out of 10 registered homicides in Mexico and nearly a third of organized 
crime-style homicides documented by the Mexican government. However, in 
2011, the relative share of homicides and organized crime-style killings in Juarez 
diminished, as violence spread elsewhere. According to SNSP, overall homicides 
dropped from 2,738 in 2010 to 1,460 in 2011. From 2011 to 2012, Juarez saw a 
continued decline in overall homicides, from 1,460 to 656. As a result, for the first 
time since 2008 the border city was displaced from its unenviable position as the 
municipality registering the most homicides nationwide. Instead, that title went to 
the resort city of Acapulco in 2012. Over the last six years, Acapulco saw a 
dramatic increase in the number of overall homicides occurring there. In 2008, 
with 70 homicides, Acapulco was ranked ninth nationwide. The number of 
homicides in Acapulco grew to 150 in 2009, 370 in 2010, 1,008 in 2011, and 
1,170 in 2012, gradually increasing the city’s ranking for overall homicides. 
(Molzahn, C., Rodriguez Ferreira, O., & Shirk, D. A., 2013, p. 26) 
 
Meanwhile, three other major cities experienced similarly large and rapid 
increases in overall homicides in recent years: Monterrey, Torreón, and Nuevo 
Laredo=in the northern border state of Nuevo León, Monterrey had 22 
homicides in 2009, but this number grew to 179 in 2010 and 700 in 2011, before 
falling to 551 in 2012. Torreón, the largest city in the neighboring state of 
Coahuila, experienced 316 homicides in 2010, 455 in 2011, and 462 in 2012. 
Meanwhile, the border city of Nuevo Laredo saw a sharp increase to 288 
homicides in 2012, up from the 123 homicides that occurred there the year 
before. (Molzahn, C., Rodriguez Ferreira, O., & Shirk, D. A., 2013, p.27) 
 
The changing trends of geographical distribution of violence can be attributed to 
the temporal shift both cartel and state-sponsored violence and the conflicts. The 
increased violence registered for the 2008-2010 period correlates to conflicts between 
specific drug cartels operating in particular geographic regions. In the northwestern 
Mexico, the Arrellano Felix cartel faced new competition from the Sinaloa cartel. In the 
north-central corridor through Juarez, the Carrillo Fuentes family also faced competition 
from the Sinaloa Cartel. In northeastern Mexico violence can be attributed to a falling out 
between the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas, while violence in central Mexico can be blamed 
on clashes between the Beltran Leyva, the Familia Michoacana and the Knights Templar 
cartels. The geographic shift in violence patterns in 2012 seems to be explained in large 
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by the consolidation of the Sinaloa cartel power in Baja California, Sinaloa, Sonora and 
Chihuahua; and the territorial expansion of the Zetas towards Tamaulipas, Coahuila, 
Nuevo Leon and Veracruz. The local geographies of the drug war violence seem overall 
to be driven by the dynamic within and among the cartels for the control of the territory. 
(International Crisis Group, 2013, p.1-4)   
 
D. Neglected Victimhood: 90 per cent of the deaths are members of the organized 
crime6 
President Calderon’s administration assured the Mexican public dismissively that 
90 per cent of the death toll of the drug war represented members of the organized 
crime. (Cascante, 2011) The statement is a good example of the overall discursive 
practice of the Mexican authorities regarding victimhood associated to the drug war. It is 
underpinned by a complete disregard of the rule of law, basically condoning the killing of 
alleged cartel members instead of making them go through the national judiciary system. 
Additionally, by projecting the official death toll and civilian casualties as the remaining 
10 per cent, the narrative minimizes the social cost brought about by Calderon’s national 
security strategy. The administration’s notion of victimhood was discursively narrowed, 
as exemplified by the introductory statement to this section, throughout the initial stage 
of the implementation of this strategy. It was not until 2009 when a series of high profile 
confrontations resulting in a high number of civilian casualties, that the narrative of 
victimhood articulated by the government was proven to be conveniently limited and 
extremely obscure.  
This narrative was later projected in the coding of the main database of killings 
associated with the war, presented by the government in January 2012. (Presidencia de 
la Republica, 2012, p.2) The database claimed to reflect the “killings associated to 
presumed criminal rivalry” and was eventually renamed “Database of Homicides 
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Presumably Related to Organized Crime”. According to its methodological annex, it was 
constructed with the aim of providing means for following up the phenomenon of 
violence associated with organized crime. With this goal, the federal government 
generated a “systematized and reliable registry” of killings within the drug war context. 
The categorization of the data conceals important implications regarding the victimhood 
framework of President Calderon. The database integrated three datasets composed of 
the following categories: executions, confrontations (against the authority and between 
criminals) and aggressions against authority figures and governmental property. These 
categories reflected very specifically defined notions of officially acknowledged 
victimhood: 
(1) Executions: A killing in this category represents that in which the victim or the 
perpetrator is presumably a member of an organization with links to organized crime and 
it is neither result of a confrontation nor of an aggression. It involves “extreme violence” 
meaning that the victim is found decapitated, dismembered, tortured, mutilated or burnt. 
It also involves a “multiple” component meaning killings that imply more than one single 
victim.  
The following are characteristics of a victim of an execution: the victim presents 
gun impacts; signals of torture or mutilation; the victim was killed where the body was 
found, in a different place to that in which it was found or in the interior of a vehicle; the 
materials used to carry on the killing are consistent with the organized crime modus 
operandi; the victim is presumed to have a relationship with organized crime groups; the 
victim was found next to a message of the organized crime; and finally, the victim was 
kidnapped, ambushed or persecuted before being killed. (Presidencia de la Republica, 
2012, p.5) 
(2) Confrontation: This category includes the killings resulting from spontaneous 
and isolated acts of violence, from the commission of criminal acts, the disturbance of 
16 
 
social peace and order through acts against authority figures carried out by organized 
criminal groups using firearms and military equipment. They can also be defined by 
events in which the public, due to the circumstances, are forced to use their weapons to 
ensure respect of the law. Additionally, killings resulting from events between members 
of groups of organized crime and feuds between different cartels will be considered 
within this category.  
For an event to be considered as a confrontation it may include the following 
characteristics: that the criminals involved are at least three individuals or that in case of 
being less, they make use of weapons considered to be of exclusive use of the military; 
that the criminals resist authority through violent and lethal means; in cases in which the 
criminals cannot be controlled in a quick way involving one single tactic action from the 
public forces; a persecution derived from the previously stated aggressions; and events 
in which authority figures responds to an aggression with a sustained gunfire exchange. 
(Presidencia de la Republica, 2012, p.5) 
(3) Aggressions against authority: The acts categorized under this type include 
the attacks by organized criminal groups against authorities of any of the three levels of 
government, in which the later does not have the opportunity to repell the attack by use 
of force. The main intent behind these attacks is to affect the institutions or intimidate 
security personnel in a generic manner, not targeting any one particular individual. 
These attacks are carried out against government property, military checkpoints, goods 
and services used by the government, and supervision convoys. (Presidencia de la 
Republica, 2012, p.7) 
A series of high-profile cases, widely covered by the media, made it clear that the 
limitations of the official notion of victimhood conveniently relived the government 
ofresponsibility or accountability under the allegation of “presumed links to organized 
crime groups or internal feuds.” (View Appendix Table 1: High-profile cases involving 
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civilian casualties in Mexico 2009-2011) Calderon’s administration’s practice surrounding 
these cases denoted a consistent pattern of behavior within the Mexican institutions both 
local and federal, that demonstrates not just a lack of resources for investigating the 
facts behind the killings related to the drug violence, but a lack of will to actually look into 
who the victims are. This official trend compromises access to justice by failing to 
establish evidence linking the victims and the cartels and a whether or not there is real 
motivation behind these murders. The information contained in Table 1 and resulting 
from the preliminary content analysis of the media coverage of 21 cases facilitates the 
reconstruction of the traditional governmental narrative of victimhood in the context of 
the drug war.  
This narrative is based upon the assumption that the victims are in some way 
connected to organized crime, which in turn provides the government with its central 
justification for its national security strategy. At points within this narrative, the level of 
violence and its escalation are discursively framed as an indicator of success. The 
insistence that most of the killed within the war have presumed links to the cartels, has 
allowed the government of Felipe Calderon to portray his war as having a marginal 
impact in Mexican society. This however, represents a dangerous reinterpretation of 
Mexican reality, one with actual practical costs for the government. The assumption that 
every murder that complies with one or more of the characteristics stated within the 
officially acknowledged notions of victimhood, introduces high levels of uncertainty and 
subjectivity to the national security strategy. Additionally, the numbers resulting from the 
official database provide an extremely weak foundation for policy-making decisions. The 
categorization of killings included in the database does not actually match any judiciary 
(neither local nor federal) typology, meaning that there is no correlation between the 
official data presented by the Calderon’s administration and the criminal investigations 
carried out by the different state attorney’s offices throughout the country. In other 
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words, the data on the killings reflects no actual pathway towards access to justice for 
the victims. 
 The rest of this document focuses on the way in which pain worked as driving 
force, enabling people to transition from victims to victimhood, and from its individualized 
experience towards its socialization and a later, politicization through the work of the 
MPJD. The main focus for the remaining sections of the thesis lies in the spatialities 
articulated throughout this process and the way in which pain became the main 
mechanism through which space was experienced and created by the members of the 
MPJD and how new spaces opened up by their actions.   
 
 
III. GEOGRAPHIES OF PAIN: THE MPJD AND THE CONFIGURATION OF 
SPACES OF VICTIMHOOD 
On late March 2011, a social movement initiated by relatives of victims of drug 
violence and state-sponsored human rights abuses was articulated in Mexico: the 
Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity (MPJD). Its members were reacting to the 
growing toll of victims associated with the drug war, the rising number of human rights 
violations linked to the presence of the military throughout the territory and the 
humanitarian crisis the country was experiencing. Since its formation the MPJD has 
worked towards enabling diverse processes allowing for increasing awareness of victims 
of the drug war as stakeholders in the decision-making process concerning the national 
security strategy. For the MPJD members, drug-violence-related victimhood should be 
addressed with public policy recommendations that acknowledge the victims’ rights, a 
capacity development program that provides the necessary skills for effectively 
participating in the policy-making process, and an agenda to comply with victims’ 
demands of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition. With these goals 
in mind, the MPJD attempts to effect a change in the Mexican state national security 
strategy transforming the disembodied idea of ‘state’ security and moving towards a 
more broadly defined notion of ‘human’ security, prioritizing both human rights and 
gender approaches.  
The MPJD has articulated two main paths of action: On one hand, an open 
channel of dialogue with the authorities, including the Executive, Legislative and 
Judiciary branches at the federal level and better communication at the local level; and 
the cooperation and coordination with some political leaders as means for leverage in 
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the public debate and decision-making processes. On the other hand, the MPJD 
has led several actions of non-violent resistance which include mass mobilizations and 
bus caravan tours through the territory as means of appropriating public spaces and 
using these actions as ways of furthering the recognition and vindication of the narrative 
of the victims’ pain. The following sections seek to unravel the underlying complexities of 
the MPJD’s notion of victimhood articulated in response to the official narrative. To do 
so, it explores the case study of the first MPJD public protest in Cuernavaca, Morelos 
and the later bus caravan mobilization that concluded with the promulgation of the 
National Pact in Juarez, Coahuila. To explore these complexities, the current document 
proposes to examine the formation stage of the movement (from April 26th, 2011 to 
June 10th, 2011) drawing from the growing literature of the subfield of emotional 
geographies.   
Despite the fact that this subfield appeals to a multiplicity of geographical 
traditions, namely the humanistic-phenomenologist, feminist, psychoanalytic and non-
representational approaches, there appears to be one common thread underlying the 
geographic work on emotions: Emotions matter. They are always present in our 
everyday-life and serve as foundations upon which human beings recompose and 
transcend the underlying routine of our mundane experience into intense understanding 
marking larger-than-life moments in our lives. Emotions then define places as much as 
they define people and since they are pervasive they can be located anywhere and 
everywhere. Emotional geography focuses on the relationality between people and the 
environment, the way in which emotions are embodied and how they serve to color our 
experiential world. Emotions are the mediators between society and space.  
Drawing from this theoretical field, and particularly the socio-spatial relationality 
of emotions, this thesis seeks to illustrate how the MPJD members’ pain associated to 
their victimhood allowed for the articulation of spaces of shared victimhood, mobilizing 
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individualized stories of pain towards creating a collective experience of this emotion and 
ultimately founding a new political expression of victimhood. This paper argues that the 
spatial aspect of the official narrative of the drug war, reflected in the geographical 
distribution of the drug violence and the spatial epistemology of the official database on 
the drug related killings, are contested by the emotional geographies constructed by the 
mobilization patterns of the MPJD, allowing the movement to articulate through its 
actions a counter-narrative of victimhood associated with the drug war and forming a 
foundation for the reconstruction of the social pact in Mexico. The data for this case 
study and the emotional geography analysis were collected through ethnographic 
content analysis which will be further explored in the following section.  
 
A. Methodology: Ethnographic Content Analysis  
Ethnographic Content Analysis (ECA) refers basically to an ethnographic 
approach to document analysis based on principles of data collection and analysis. This 
“reflexive analysis of documents” perspective can help outline patterns of human action 
by approaching document analysis as fieldwork. The “ethnographic” aspect of this kind 
of analysis refers to the description of people and their culture, in other words, human 
beings engage in meaningful behavior becomes the subject matter that guides the 
research. (Altheide, 2013, p.14)  ECA can also be referred to as qualitative document 
analysis and as research methodology it is oriented towards documenting and 
understanding the communication of meaning, as well as verifying theoretical 
relationships. It places the researcher at the center making it a highly reflexive and 
interactive methodology in nature. ECA allows the researcher to be systematic and 
analytic without having to face the constrains of a rigid protocol. It focuses on the 
collection of numerical and narrative data without forcing it into predefined categories:  
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The assumption behind ECA is that the general process of data collection, 
reflection, and protocol refinement is more significant for a study and that the 
details involving coding procedures, practices, and categories do emerge=ECA 
is not oriented to theory development but is more comfortable with clear 
descriptions and definitions compatible with the materials... [It is] more oriented 
to concept development, data collection, and emergent data analysis. (Altheide, 
2013, p.19-20)   
 
For the present thesis, the relevance of this reflexive observation strategy is 
illustrated by the study of the public protests in Mexico led by the drug war victims from 
April 26th- June 10th, 2011, as it was covered by the weekly news magazine Proceso. 
The sampling process required a qualitative exploration of the twelve numbers published 
throughout this period, from No.1796 to No. 1808. A preliminary review showed that out 
of these numbers only ten of them contained relevant material regarding the public 
protest linked to drug war-related victimhood (1796, 1797, 1798, 1799, 
1801,1802,1803,1804, 1805, and 1806). A closer reading of the content of these issues 
allowed the identification of twenty articles covering the protest mobilizations that 
included extensive individual narratives of victimhood. These articles were originally in 
Spanish hence, most of the materials have been translated by the author of this paper 
who is a native Spanish-speaker. 
The theoretical focus for the interpretation and understanding these data is 
based on literature of emotional geographies further described on the next section. The 
literature review of the subfield provided the foundation that informed the basic 
assumptions and approaches in this thesis. It enabled the researcher to conduct a 
theoretically informed reading of the news coverage, providing the necessary data for 
further conceptual refinement and analysis that exposes the spatial aspects behind the 
victims’ narratives of pain. 
 
B. Emotions Matter: Emotional Geographies as Theoretical Foundation 
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Addressing the relevance of emotions as subject-matter of geographical research 
always leads back to the Anderson and Smith (2001) editorial Emotional Geographies, 
as turning point in the disciplinary approach to both emotions and affects. In their brief 
intervention these authors call for a serious reconsideration as to the way in which 
emotions had been generally approached or more accurately disregarded as legitimate 
means for knowledge production:  
We have been reflecting on the extent to which the human world is constructed 
and lived through the emotions. In doing so, we have been forced to confront the 
glaringly obvious, yet intractable, silencing of emotion in both social research and 
public life. (p.7)  
 
The authors contextualize the neglect of emotional geographies in the “return to 
‘relevance’” of the ‘policy turn’ within geography. To counter it, they articulate a broader 
research agenda calling for the acknowledgement of emotions as legitimate objects of 
study with valuable insight potential for illuminating the emotional content of social 
relations, the possibility of emotionally charged spaces and the way in which “social 
relations are mediated by feeling and sensibility.” (p.8)  
Perhaps the most relevant idea posed by Anderson and Smith for this thesis is 
that: “Emotions are an intensely political issue=” (p.7) In the case of the pain of the 
victims of the drug war, the current document demonstrates that it is indeed the 
emotional resonance of the personal narratives of victimhood that gave rise to the 
articulation of a social space, initially in the city of Cuernavaca, Morelos, intended to 
foster the exchange of these stories. The expansion of these spaces throughout the 
mobilization of the bus caravan that concluded in Juarez, Coahuila made it possible for 
sharing of personal stories to become a counter-narrative of victimhood challenging the 
official narrative.  
It was not until few years later, that Anderson and Smith’s call for attention to 
emotional geographies was fully realized. As Steve Pile (2010) highlights, since then:  
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=geographers have described a wide range of emotions in various contexts, 
including: ambivalence, anger, anxiety, awe, betrayal, caring, closeness, comfort 
and discomfort, demoralization, depression, desire, despair, desperation, disgust, 
disillusionment, distance, dread, embarrassment, envy, exclusion, familiarity, fear 
(including phobias), fragility, grief, guilt, happiness and unhappiness, hardship, 
hatred, homeliness, horror, hostility, illness, injustice, joy, loneliness, longing, 
love, oppression, pain (emotional), panic, powerlessness, pride, relaxation, 
repression, reserve, romance, shame, stress and distress, suffering, violence, 
vulnerability, worry. Even those who declare themselves suspicious of the 
language of emotions – such as ‘hatred, shame, envy, jealousy, fear, disgust, 
anger, embarrassment, sorrow, grief, anguish, pride, love, happiness, joy, hope, 
wonder’ – have nonetheless attended to anger, boredom, comfort and 
discomfort, despair, distress, enchantment, energy, enjoyment, euphoria, 
excitement, fear, frustration, grace, happiness, hope, joy, laughing, liveliness, 
pain, playing, rage, relaxation, rhythm, sadness, shame, smiling, sorrowfulness, 
‘Star Wars affects’, surprise, tears (crying), touching, violence, vitality. (p.6)  
 
The plethora of research on emotional geographies today sheds light into an 
element which has been missing from our discipline. It allows for a disciplinary self-
reflection that decomposes and recomposes disciplinary boundaries of what may be 
included within our field. It is not about opening our eyes to this new emotional terra 
incognita, but rather about making us aware that these unexplored territories permeate 
all of the previously done geographical research and that acknowledging its emotional 
dimension recomposes the field in a socio-historical level.  In her paper: Making 
connections and thinking through emotions: between geography and psychotherapy, Liz 
Bondi (2005) reflects on the different conceptualizations of emotion, locating them within 
wider socio-historical contexts. She suggests that the ‘emotional turn’ within our 
discipline has been informed mainly by three existing bodies of geographical 
scholarship: humanistic, feminist and non-representational geographies. In exploring the 
academic debates concerning the engagement with emotions, Bondi highlights their key 
limitations and makes a case for psychotherapy as an additional venue for developing a 
relational approach to emotional geographies.  (p.434)   
Based on the works of Ley and Samuels (1978), Rowles (1978) and Tuan 
(1979), Bondi (2005) brings attention to the emotional engagement of humanistic 
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geography as a concern for the “subjective dimensions of human life= [Attending to] 
how people feel and experience places and spaces.” (p.435) She additionally points to 
the influence of phenomenology and existentialism on redirecting humanistic geography 
towards questions of human meanings, perceptions and values; coining concepts like 
‘life-world’ to “overcome the distinctions between objective and subjective, and between 
external and internal worlds” (p. 435); and emphasizing the capacity of places to evoke 
emotions. Furthermore, the phenomenological approach identifies a world that is not the 
result of the Cartesian dualism, but rather a lived world perceived and produced through 
emotionally laden activities, recognizing the self’s entanglement with its surroundings. 
Places like people can be understood as being constituted within an emotionally charged 
middle ground (Casey,2001) and in this sense, the phenomenological tradition offers a 
mean to develop descriptions of how emotions occur in everyday life, understood as the 
richly expressive feeling-cum-behavior of continual becoming that is chiefly provided by 
bodily states and processes. (Thrift, 2004, p.60) 
Feminist geography approaches emotions in a different way. Steve Pile (2009) 
summarizes it brilliantly when he states that “if humanistic geography describes people’s 
rich experiences of place and emotions, then feminist geographers politicized it.” (p.7) 
By bringing attention to women’s experiences of space and place feminist geographers 
uncover feelings, but also make explicit connections with the broader social system of 
politics and power allowing for emotions to be framed, consequently producing a 
gendered experience. While investigating these taken-for-granted emotional aspects of 
women’s embodied experiences, feminist geography emphasizes the relational, 
reflective and inter-subjective nature of emotional relations that permeate geographical 
practices. Pile (2009) further articulates this matter by citing Valentine’s The geography 
of women’s fear (1989) and explaining that “under feminist imperatives humanist studies 
of landscapes of fear became studies of the social geographies of women’s fear... fear 
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itself was re-interrogated by emotional geography as having both interior and exterior 
aspects [while]=calling any presumption of a fixed binary of interior and exterior into 
question.” (Pile, 2009, p.7) 
Non-representational theory adds a complete new layer to the mix by focusing on 
the necessary incompleteness within the act of representation itself. This approach 
prioritizes the use of the notion of ‘affect’ rather than emotion because, as Nigel Thrift 
suggests the latter is indicative of those more immediate embodied engagements with 
the world beyond language. This break on the representability of emotions and affect 
has configured a larger debate resulting in two distinct approaches: emotional and 
affectual geographies. Pile (2009) teases out the similarities and differences between 
both and identifies agreement on matters of a relational ontology, privileging of proximity 
and intimacy and the favoring of ethnographic methods, while exploring the political 
implications of the fundamental disagreement concerning the relationship or non-
relationship between emotions and affect.   
Moreover, the psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic perspectives have strongly 
influenced the work on emotions in geography. Bondi’s (2005) work regarding this 
matter, explores the different factors that mitigate the creation, maintenance, or 
dissolution of the psychosocial boundaries that are constitutive of individual subjectivity 
and social identities. Emotions clearly play a fundamental role in the formative processes 
which impact both individual mental health and sociopolitical cohesion, shaping social 
relations through the mediation of the self’s relations to those deemed as the other. An 
additional aspect of her work that particularly informs the current thesis is the ethical 
imperative of taking people’s expressed emotions seriously. This is clearly stated in her 
description of how a psychotherapeutic approach might aid geographical research:   
“[psychotherapists] listen and seek to convey understanding of the other person’s 
emotional experience; they cultivate a form of acceptance sustainable in the 
context of deeply disturbed and disturbing behavior, informed by a belief in the 
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human potential for repair and positive self-development; and they meet with 
those with whom they work as emotionally open, honest and genuine people.” 
(p.442) 
 
Steve Pile (2009) further reinforces the ethical imperative by assuring that it 
“privileges people’s expressed emotional experiences, and treats their accounts as 
open, honest and genuine.” (p. 8) The work presented in this thesis seeks to understand 
the spatialities of the MPJD notion of victimhood, a notion that was created as a reaction 
to the neglect, silence and manipulation reproduced by the official narrative of 
victimhood associated with the drug war. Hence, while the author acknowledges the 
relevance brought about by an affectual geography perspective, she considers this 
specific aspect of the psychotherapeutic influence of emotional geography as necessary 
means to pay respect to the research subject she is engaging with and the bloodshed 
that the personal narratives of victimhood used on this thesis represent.    
The final section of this literature review, builds upon these authors’ work by 
making a case for the relevance of emotions in the configuration of the spatiality of social 
relations. It explores the way in which the vindication of emotional knowledge can be 
incorporated into the geographical analysis of political activism and social change. 
(Bosco, 2007, p.549) Fernando Bosco’s work Emotions that Build Networks: 
Geographies of Human Rights Movements in Argentina and Beyond (2007) and his 
previous work on the Argentinian movement of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo explore 
the interplay between social movements and emotions, highlighting the strategic 
importance of emotions to activist mobilization and to the sustainability of activism 
across space-time. He brilliantly references Pulido (2003, p.47) on her call to 
geographers to probe further into the ‘interior life of politics’, those dimensions of 
activism that are rooted inside humans as individuals and that include emotions. (Bosco, 
2007, p.549) Fernando Bosco (2007) brings attention to the fact that despite there being 
cross-disciplinary work regarding the emotions of activism and the geographies of social 
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movement in relation to ‘mobilizing grievances’, there is a lack of a unified conceptual 
framework. He engages in a synthesizing exercise bringing together existing research 
on this issue to articulate what he deems a “fruitful conceptual platform from where to 
pursue further research” (p. 549) which he summarizes as follows:  
“The emotional dimensions of social networks are crucial for the emergence and 
cohesion of activists in social movements (Taylor & Rupp, 2002). Many times, 
such emotional dimensions are tied to home places of resistance (Routledge, 
1993; Pile & Keith, 1997) because places themselves are often layered with 
emotional symbolism that relate to past activism (Ansell, 1997; Bosco 2006). 
Because places are open, porous and relational (Massey 1991, 1993) the 
emotional identification of activists with particular places is of strategic 
importance to the construction and maintenance of personal bonds among 
activists and of larger trans-local networks (Ettlinger & Bosco 2004). In the latter 
case, activists in broader, geographically-dispersed networks experience 
emotional proximity – rather than actual local interaction – through their 
emotional connection to key symbolic places that are important to the movement 
(Bosco 2006, p. 359) or through new communications technology(such as the 
Internet) that provide virtual meeting grounds (Escobar 1999; Hess & 
Zimmerman 1999; Hampton & Wellman 2003). Even though communications 
technology provides a valuable infrastructure for networking, place and place-
based social ties are still important (Parham 2004). Both symbolic and virtual 
places create arenas that permit the performance of reciprocal emotional bonds 
and enhance emotional proximity among participants. The strategic deployment 
of emotions is also crucial in the construction of broader activist networks. 
Activists often draw from shared ‘emotional templates’ (Taylor & Rupp 2002, p. 
151) that allow for specific interpretations and displays of emotions and that are 
influenced by the larger social and cultural context. Activists often also create 
emotional templates that align with interpretations and experiences of the 
emotions of other groups (Jasper 1997, 1998)=the construction of broader 
activists’ networks also occurs through a process of ‘place framing’ (Martin 2003) 
– when activists strategically and symbolically talk about places to match the 
interests of other groups.” (Bosco, 2006, p.549-550) 
 
His synthesis of ideas informs the current research by providing the theoretical 
foundations to explore the way in which pain worked as a driving force, enabling people 
to transition from victims to victimhood, and from its individualized experience towards its 
socialization and a later, politicization. The following section seeks to illustrate the 
spatialities articulated throughout this process; and to illuminate through personal 
narratives of victimhood how pain became the main lens through which space was 
experienced by the members of the MPJD from the first public protest in Cuernavaca, 
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Morelos and the later bus caravan mobilization that concluded with the promulgation of 
the National Pact in Juarez, Coahuila. The following sections explain the history behind 
the foundation of the MPJD and the situated personal narratives as means to articulate 
the geographies of pain and the configuration of spaces of victimhood throughout the 
first ‘caravan for peace’. 
 
C. Pain and the Configuration of Spaces of Victimhood  
a. From Cuernavaca, Morelos to Mexico City: Birth of the MPJD 
Alexander Von Humboldt referred to the city of Cuernavaca, Morelos as the “City 
of the Eternal Spring” during his travels through Mexico in the early 1800s. By this, he 
was making reference to the paradisiac climate characterizing this place, a distinctive 
feature that had positioned it as a major touristic destination in the country. However, 
after the implementation of the drug war national security strategy by president 
Calderon, the spatial perception of the state was reconfigured by the presence of the 
organized crime and the increase of drug related violence. News reports indicate how by 
April 2011, the “Highway of the Sun”, the main road leading to the Acapulco, was being 
referred to by the local population as the “Route of Death”, mainly because the part of 
the road that stretches through Cuernavaca became the dumping site for most of the 
335 bodies, victims of executions in the state of Morelos from 2010-2011 alone. Local 
accounts blamed the state’s governor, Marco Antonio Adame Castillo, for turning 
Cuernavaca into the battleground for the organized crime. Within the first four months of 
2011, the death toll amounted to 80 executions, five times more than those registered 
during the first quarter of the previous year, while neither the military nor the police at the 
municipal, state and federal levels had made any arrests. (Olmos, 2011a) 
Jose Gil Olmos (2011a) reports how the impact of the violence and the presence 
of organized crime has affected local life, while the authorities reinforce a narrative in 
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which neither of these factors has affected people’s living in the city: “No es como 
Juarez” (It is not like Juarez). The journalist cites the words of the state’s attorney and 
counters them with the narratives of Juan Carlos Salgado Ponce, former president of the 
local Mexican Employers’ Association (COPARMEX) and the Independent Commission 
of Human Rights of Morelos. According to the former, tourism has dropped nearly 60 per 
cent, despite the fact that the state’s government keeps assuring citizens that tourism 
has increased by 4 per cent; the latter affirms that insecurity, violence and the presence 
of organized crime in Cuernavaca has completely shredded the social fabric and that 
fear has forced its inhabitants to take extreme preventive measures: not talking about 
organized crime in public places or taxi cabs, reducing leisure time spent in public 
spaces, avoiding taking any roads after sunset and not trusting the police who are 
perceived as working for the cartels. A case that reinforces the counter-narrative as to 
the social impact of the drug war in Cuernavaca took place in April 16th, 2010, when 
most of the city’s population complied with a curfew allegedly dictated by the South 
Pacific cartel. Fear had paralyzed Cuernavaca. (Olmos, 2011a) 
After the discovery of a series of bodies on March 27, 2011 amongst which that 
of Juan Francisco Sicilia, son of the Mexican poet and political analyst Javier Sicilia was 
found, the city erupted in protests against the national security strategy and more 
specifically, against the administration of Marco Antonio Adame Castillo, governor of 
Morelos. Javier Sicilia is perceived as the founding member of the MPJD, because the 
public outrage and mass mobilization that followed the killings of March 27 highlighted 
the death of his son, but also because he took the lead in the strategic deployment of 
emotions. His first effort to articulate his pain and victimhood towards a political agenda 
that responded to the national context was introduced in an open letter published in 
Proceso a week after his son’s murder, titled: “We are fed up (Open letter to politicians 
and criminals)”.  Throughout the text of this document, Sicilia explains that his pain is not 
31 
 
exclusive, but rather a common reality in Mexico caused not just by the organized crime 
but by the “rotten hearts” of both the political class and the criminal groups, that had 
broken their honor codes. Upon the foundation of his pain, Sicilia elaborates an 
argument for social action based on both solidarity and indignation and calls for the first 
protest of what was to become the MPJD:  
“There are not words for this pain. Only poetry can come close to it, and you do 
not know about poetry. What I do wish to say to you today from these mutilated 
lives, from the pain that has no name because it is fruit of something that does 
not belong in nature – the death of a child is always unnatural and that’s why it 
has no name: I don’t know if it is orphan or widow, but it is simply and painfully 
nothing – from these, I repeat, mutilated lives, from this suffering, from the 
indignation that these deaths have provoked, it is simply that we have had it up to 
here=The death of my son Juan Francisco has lifted up solidarity and a cry of 
indignation – that my family and I appreciate from the depth of our hearts – from 
the citizenry, and from the media. That indignation comes back anew to put in 
our ears the phrase that Martí directed at those who govern: “If you can’t, then 
resign.” Putting this back in our ears – after the thousands of anonymous and not 
anonymous cadavers that we have at our backs, which is to say, of so many 
innocents assassinated and debased – this phrase must be accompanied by 
large citizen mobilizations that obligate you, at these moments of national 
emergency, to unite to create an agenda that unites the nation and believes in a 
state of real governability. The citizen networks of the state of Morelos are calling 
for a national march on Wednesday, April 6, that will leave at 5 p.m. from the 
monument of the Dove of Peace to the Government Palace, demanding justice 
and peace. If the citizenry does not unite in this and constantly reproduce it in all 
cities, in all towns and regions of the country, if we are not capable of obligating 
you, “señores” politicians, to govern with justice and dignity, and you, “señores” 
criminals, to retake your codes of honor and limit your savagery, the spiral this 
violence has generated will bring us on a path of horror without return. If you, 
“señores” politicians do not govern well and do not take seriously that we live in a 
state of national emergency that requires your unity, and you, “señores” 
criminals, do not limit your actions, you will end up winning and having power but 
you will govern and reign over a mountain of ossuaries and of beings that are 
beaten and destroyed in their souls, a dream that none of us envy.” (Sicilia, 
2011a) 
 
Sicilia’s call for action was taken up by many residents in 38 cities around 
Mexico. On an interview the day after the protest, he referred to the official narrative of 
victimhood as denying and deforming reality, he further stated that: “Language makes 
sense of reality; when the language is corrupted, the nation is betrayed.”(Sicilia, 2011a) 
During the protest acts in Cuernavaca, Sicilia reflected upon pain as a driving force, 
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saying that “Pain is not for hating, but for recovering the love and justice that have been 
lost.” (Sicilia, 2011a) 
This first protest and those that followed reconfigured the sense of space and 
opened the possibility of emotional spaces. The generalized fear had turned homes into 
prisons. The context of violence increased the social distance among members of 
Mexican society and shredded the social fabric. Living under this reality, the 
consequences of the drug war were perceived on an individual level, as isolated cases 
of victimhood. The official narrative only reinforced the exceptionalist nature of 
victimhood: 90 per cent of the casualties had chosen their fate by joining the criminal 
organizations and an unfortunate 10 per cent that represented both civilian casualties, 
framed as collateral damages and members of the army “fallen in action”. The protest 
represented a collective adherence to Sicilia’s “We are fed up” claim and in itself, 
constructed a new moral boundary, a line that Mexican society was not willing to cross, a 
spatial expression of moral indignation and ethical rebellion. Within this collectivity 
diverse and contradictory individualized identities are merged under the aspiration for a 
greater good led by higher values.  
The reconfiguration of the perception of space by the act of reclaiming public 
spaces through the MPJD mobilizations is an act that in itself constructs a counter-
narrative. This alternative story founded upon the massive expressions of citizen outrage 
and the thousands of individualized stories of victimhood challenge the normalization of 
the social consequences of drug war violence. The protests configure spaces of 
victimhood that redefine this experience, collectivizing it, constructing a shared sense of 
victimhood and reshaping the epistemological and moral coherence behind the official 
narrative. The shared notion of victimhood arising from these spaces, fostered a 
renewed awareness of the sense of vulnerability of Mexican society; of the level of 
involvement of the nation in the reconstruction of the social fabric and the re-emergence 
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of a sense of hope for the population at large. The counter-narrative was articulated by 
having Mexican society reclaim ownership over national consensus regarding 
Calderon’s national security strategy. The participants of the MPJD protests and the later 
bus caravan made it clear that the governmental action was illegitimate in the eyes of 
many Mexicans. The sense of social consensus backing it up had been artificially 
constructed through the crafting of a very narrow narrative of the drug war and its limited 
acknowledgement of victimhood that left no space for greater social consequences. 
These newly created spaces of victimhood though ever-changing and ephemeral, 
created a rupture that forced Mexican society towards resistance, into a collective 
reflection, towards action and the reconstruction of the social fabric, towards retaking the 
streets, breaking the confinement, re-humanizing the different parties to the war 
(authorities, drug cartels, civil society groups, victims of the drug-related-violence, 
Mexican society), above it all to avoid the officially-sanctioned narrative reproduced in 
the media: that the ends justified the means.   
The reconstruction of a shared victimhood founded upon the acknowledgement 
of the commonality of pain was in itself a political act that had two objectives: reclaiming 
justice and letting other victims know that they were not alone in their experience of 
victimhood. The construction of a sense of solidarity and trust allowed for the 
participants, victims of the so-called drug war to tell their stories. A few of these personal 
narratives of victimhood were collected by Proceso’s journalist Jose Gil Olmos (2011e) 
during the protest march that took place from April 5th to April 8th, 2011 from the 
fountain of the Peace Dove placed in the exit from Cuernavaca towards the main plaza, 
Zocalo in Mexico City, are translated and reproduced here to exemplify the diversity of 
experiences and the multiplicity of causes of victimhood associated with the Mexican 
context. These stories and thousands more just like them, provided the backdrop for the 
MPJD’s counter-narrative not just to the drug war but the national context, allowing it to 
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identify deeper root causes for the drug war reality and providing the movement with the 
necessary tools for articulating a concrete political agenda to promote social change.  
Olmos (2011e) describes the crowd as citizens, walking together some carrying 
the photos of their relatives who had been either murdered or disappeared. Despite the 
fact that the journalist followed the march that took place from Cuernavaca to Mexico 
City, the protest as said before was replicated in at least 38 cities, where as Olmos 
(2011e) describes it “the land is also tainted with blood”. Olga Lidia Reyes narrated her 
story: “Hope is built step by step=we are all united by Javier Sicilia’s pain.” She admits 
to being nervous but becomes indignant when she remembers her six relatives killed, 
the four houses that had been burnt to the ground in Chihuahua; and her mother and 
daughters locked away on a safe house under federal protection. Another story is that of 
Julian LeBaron, a Mennonite from Chihuahua who had led a social protest in Chihuahua 
against the kidnapping and murders of his brother Benjamin and his friend Luis Widmar 
on July 2009. Conzuelo Valenzuela a 60 year-old woman tells the story of her daughter 
Julieta Marlen Gonzalez who went missing ten years before in Chihuahua. Maria Elena 
Sanchez, a young woman seeks to find her brother Jethro Ramses, who had just gone 
missing from the local fair in Cuernavaca on May 1st, 2011, just a few days before the 
protest. Miguel Garcia Hurtado, despite being state’s attorney of Michoacan was 
wrongfully accused of having links with the organized crime and imprisoned without 
enough evidence. Another narrative is that of the mother of Joaquin Tena, who 
describes how her son used to love the sea. After spending some time in Cancun, he 
returned Mexico City to pursue studies in architecture at the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM). However, his dreams were cut short on August 7th, 2010 
when an armed group broke into his house and gunned him down. He lived near Parque 
Hundido, in Mexico City and was only 21 years.  (Olmos, 2011e) 
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The relatives of Niza, Rocio and Jose Angel Alvarado, who went missing in 
Chihuahua walk along those of Palma Leticia Portillo who was murdered in 2010 in the 
same state. Hector, a sixteen-year old boy who decided to change his last name after 
his brother Paris was murdered in 2010. Paris was twenty-eight years old and Hector 
demands justice for him. Along with all of them walks the father of Melchor Flores 
Hernandes, originally from the State of Mexico, Melchor left his home to try his luck in 
Monterrey where he used to do public performance in Santa Lucia, right next to the 
state’s capitol. On February 25th, 2009, he was detained by the local police units 534, 
538 and 540. Since then, no one has heard from him. His father tells how they have 
exhausted every possible legal resource, yet no one is listening. Their involvement in the 
protest is based on this need to be heard, he says. The family members of the 48 
children that died on the fire of the ABC daycare center in Hermosillo march along 
demanding punishment for those responsible for the fire. One of them, Jose Francisco 
Garcia Quintana, who lost his son Andres Alonso Garcia Duarte explains how everyone 
that was arrested was released due to weakening of the state’s evidence: “They mock 
us, they mock our pain. This is why we are participating in this protest, because we have 
been affected by the corruption and the impunity. There is no justice. We tell people not 
to stay at home, not to think that they are safe, we ask them to come out and protest 
because the situation is severe all over the country.” (Olmos, 2011e) 
When the group protesting alongside Sicilia walked along the Mexico-
Cuernavaca highway stretch between km 76-78, it stopped in front of a cross with the 
name of Jesus Sanchez, a 35 year old man who had been murdered on April 22nd, 
2010. Sicilia asked for a minute of silence. “We must look at each other in the eye to be 
able to recognize ourselves in the other. Right now there is a lot of pain in us, but we 
must look at each other to recognize ourselves as human beings. The pact that we are 
proposing comes from the heart and from love.” Olga Lidia Reyes explains that “peace 
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opens the way through firm steps, getting rid of the fear that has got into us to our 
bones, paralyzed us and forcing people to stay in their homes.” (Olmos, 2011e) 
The reconfiguration of space prompted by the protest in Cuernavaca was 
replicated in many other places and allowed for the collectivization of pain and the 
articulation of a sense of shared victimhood. The socialization process conducted 
through the sharing of individual narratives of victimhood also countered the very 
simplistic official narrative of the problems affecting the country. It allowed for the 
identification of the root causes of the violent Mexican reality and their inclusion on what 
the emerging MPJD would define as the National Pact a few weeks later. This pact 
represented the politization of that victim’s pain that initially drove people to the streets, a 
citizen-devised mechanism to put pressure on the political class. The protests reflected a 
generalized sense of exhaustion over the national context and a renewed cry for peace 
and justice. This cry, Pietro Ameglio stated, was related to a specific space, territory and 
time. The cry for peace in Cuernavaca was different than the cry for peace in Juarez, 
and it was different today than it was five years ago (as referenced in Olmos, 2011f).  
Despite the fact that after this first protest march the embryonic MPJD, had a 
draft of the National Pact including six very specific proposals for social change, there 
was still work needed in terms of emotional mobilization. In an interview right after the 
march, Javier Sicilia explained how his son’s death allowed people to channel and name 
the accumulated pain, that which had been erased by the government under the slogan 
of collateral damages: “All of a sudden the death of my son started naming all that pain, 
naming the dead, showing that those collateral damages were not just numbers, that 
plenty of them were not criminals and that all of them had a name, surname, broken 
families. After the people started naming their pain, they started moving away from their 
fear.” (Olmos, 2011f) Seven weeks after the murder of Sicilia’s son and these first 
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expressions of society’s public rejection of Calderon’s national security strategy, the 
world started witnessing the birth of a national peace movement: the MPJD. 
 
b. The First Caravan for Peace: 3,000 Km. down the Route of Blood 
After the first interstate protest, the MPJD called for a longer march, one that 
traveled throughout the “national geographies of destruction” (Olmos, 2011g), from 
Cuernavaca where the movement was born to Juarez, Coahuila. Within a timeframe of 
six days, from June 4th to June 10th, 2011, the national Caravan for Peace with Justice 
and Dignity visited nine states and traveled through approximately 3,000 km. These 
states had been particularly affected by the drug war violence, within five years the 
death toll for these territories totaled 19,000 dead by the hand of three cartels: Sinaloa, 
the Familia Michoacana and the Zetas. (Olmos, 2011g) Javier Sicilia explained the goal 
of the bus caravan: “The aim is to go where the hearts are hurting the most, break the 
fear, break the fence, hug each other and let the lords of death- wherever they are, 
whether they are criminals or people in the public administration working with organized 
crime- that we Mexicans are not alone.” (Olmos, 2011g)  
The MPJD symbolically referred to this route as the route of terror or the route of 
blood. Proceso reported the number of killings that took place since the implementation 
of the drug war strategy in the cities where the caravan stopped, these corroborated the 
accuracy of such a title: Mexico City (825); State of Mexico (1500); Michoacán (1750); 
San Luis Potosi (261); Zacatecas, Durango, Saltillo and Monterrey (4500); and Torreon 
(2500). (Olmos, 2011h) Sicilia explained the multi-dimensional symbolism of the 
caravan:   
“[As a] caravan of consolation” it was a demonstration of the country’s unity and 
bravery; It is an open message of hope and justice for the thousands of families 
affected by Calderon’s national security strategy; It is about giving continuity 
visiting those places hurt the most, keep consoling each other, letting each other 
know that we are not alone, feeling each other’s pain acknowledging that we are 
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still a brotherly country, a country that can be united in pain, in love to construct a 
citizen consciousness. The Caravan for Peace will take place in a climate of 
violence and death, and hence its double message: One for the government and 
one for the criminals. We want to let them know that we are fed up with their war, 
their corruption, from their willingness to humiliate this nation. People want to live 
in peace and walk to the streets every day without fear.” (Olmos, 2011g)   
 
The presence of the caravan articulated spaces of shared victimhood like those 
that had been previously opened up in Cuernavaca and Mexico City. In this way, the 
caravan collected testimonials of victims in every public plaza of every town and 
community visited, even along the road towards Juarez. It brought attention to the 
families of the victims and again challenged the official narrative by also highlighting that 
this reclaimed drug-war victimhood was not just civilian in nature but that it included 
members of the police and military forces too.  Some of the victimhood stories shared 
along the way are reproduced below: 
In the state of Zacatecas, two families denounced cases in which members of the 
municipal and ministerial police forces disappeared at hands of the Zetas. Enriqueta 
Trejo narrated the story of her son, Dagoberto Esparza who was a ministerial police 
officer and went missing on September 24th, 2010 after the detention of a group of 
armed men, allegedly members of the Zetas. Dagoberto had not been part it, but had 
been photographed standing next to the alleged hitmen when the authorities presented 
the arrest to the media. According to his mother, Dagoberto had received a call, asking 
for the release of the men arrested or would face the consequences if he did not comply. 
Later that day Dagoberto went out to buy hamburgers with a colleague, Veronica. They 
were both kidnapped. His mother explained that the attorney office did not share any 
information with her and that the state governor refused to meet with them. She had 
learned that Veronica had been released, but Dagoberto’s mother had been prevented 
from contacting her to inquire about her son.  (Olmos, 2011i)   
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In the municipality of Calera, Zacatecas, Edgar Heriberto Quezada went missing 
on July 13th, 2010. His mother, Ofelia Castillo tells how her son called her in fear, 
claiming that a group of men who introduced themselves as zetas, had threatened him. 
Before becoming member of the police force, Heriberto was a first sergeant in the Army. 
His family denounced his disappearance to the authorities, but his mother claimed that it 
was the municipal police who handed him to the zetas.  (Olmos, 2011i) 
In Monterrey, Gloria Aguilera denounced the disappearance of her husband and 
two sons all of them transit police in Santa Catarina, who went missing in September 
2008: “They have a name, a face and a mother looking for them.” On June 7th, as the 
caravan traveled through Saltillo, a young female journalist gave an anonymous 
testimonial, saying that since 2007 there had been six registered attacks against the 
offices of the media in Coahuila. The newspapers, she stated, received anonymous calls 
prohibiting the publication of certain news coverage dealing with the organized crime.  
(Olmos, 2011i)  
The configuration of spaces of shared victimhood challenges the official narrative 
of the social consequences of the war. Javier Sicilia reflected about what he saw during 
the caravan:  
“We found more than what we expected because of the massive load of 
suffering, of impunity, of injustice that we have seen. There are too many people 
in pain for the death of their sons and daughters, their parents, their brothers and 
sisters; there is an immense injustice and a big public outcry for it.  I was 
expecting pain, but not at the levels that we have collected through the way. This 
is a clear indication that both the political class and the president have a wrongful 
vision, foreign and abstract to the country, and this is why they are so divorced 
from the needs of its citizenry.” (Olmos, 2011i)  
 
The changing spatialities of the caravan reflected a new stage for the social 
struggle and the peace movement in Mexico. It reflected a call for action led by Mexican 
society, a purposeful engagement with the national context, it was not just about 
rejecting Calderon’s notion of armed peace but rather all of the stakeholders in Mexican 
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society to redefine the notion of peace towards one founded upon the pillars of justice 
and dignity. The decision of making Juarez the final destination of the caravan and the 
host city for signing the National Pact reflected the paradoxical nature of the local 
context: Juarez was emblematic. It represented both the failure of Calderon’s national 
security strategy and the society’s action to counteract the impact of the drug related 
violence in the community through local organizing and social action. The following 
section explores this paradox further.  
 
c. Juarez, Coahuila: Shared Victimhood in Action  
On the evening of January 15th, 2009, the whole nation was shaken by the news 
of an alleged cartel attack against a group of young students between 15 and 20 years 
of age, who had gathered to party at a house at the residential complex of Villas de 
Salvarcar in Juarez. The students were surprised by an armed group of at least 20 hit 
men who broke in and started shooting at the crowd. By the end of the attack the toll 
amounted to 18 dead and 10 wounded. The government, following the pattern of its 
official narrative, rushed in explaining the attack as a settling of accounts between rival 
drug dealing gangs. The families and relatives however, insisted publicly that they were 
all students and none were members of any gang. (Turati, 2011e) On February 2011, 
and due to the public outrage caused by the official narrative and the social pressure it 
engendered, Calderon’s administration announced a public policy plan for the reweaving 
of social fabric and the reduction of the levels of violence: Todos somos Juarez (We are 
all Juarez). The national reality at the time of the Peace Caravan seemed like a self-
fulfilled prophecy.  
Despite the deployment of 10,000 members of both the military and the federal 
police since 2009, the violence in the city could not be contained. Furthermore, the 
militarization represented an increase of human rights violations and the numbers cited 
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by Marcela Turati (2011e) reflect the social consequences of Todos somos Juarez: 
250,000 displaced, 7,000 killed, 10,000 orphan children. Only within 2010, the city 
registered 3,111 violent deaths, a greater number than those registered in Afghanistan 
for the same time period. The author further describes the reconfiguration of the 
landscape of the city: at least 100,000 abandoned houses, fenced streets, corner stores 
emptied, military checkpoints all over the city, generalized unemployment and insecurity.  
(Turati, 2011e) The lack of impact of Calderon’s program in the city and the generalized 
mistrust towards the government conditioned Juarez’ willingness to engage in a public 
dialogue or even allowing the involvement of official representatives in the creation of the 
National Pact promoted by the MPJD founders. The failure of the strategy and the social 
impact of the levels of violence in Juarez fostered a more active local civil society.  
Social engagement in that context was a matter of survival for most of the citizens of 
Juarez.  
The massacre of Villas de Salvarcar had configured a space of shared 
victimhood and forced the local population to counter the official narrative at least two 
years before the events in Cuernavaca. Juarez as the final destination of the caravan 
represented not just the pain, but the hope that effective citizen action could bring 
change. The violence had pushed forward the creation of profession-based civic action 
groups (doctors, students, artists, etcetera) working towards recovering public spaces in 
the city and reconstructing the social fabric. Marcela Turati (2011e) references some of 
these groups: Center for the Attention of Human Growth and Education for Peace; 
Partners, Pact for Juarez, Youth Promotion Home. Additionally, she describes a brilliant 
example of the way in which the process of ownership of victimhood took place in Villas 
Salvarcar, Juarez. After the killings, the government built a sports field and a park in 
memoriam of the victims of the massacre. Julian Contreras, local community organizer 
narrates how the poor quality of the construction offended the community:  
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“The park was done badly on purpose to demoralize the parents. That which was 
constructed was wired up, the grass is synthetic and it is badly set, the cement is 
not properly embedded in the plaster membrane, the name plates were done on 
plastic and were ripped of the wall by the parents who were so upset that they 
rather remove the names of their children and take it home.” (Turati, 2011e) 
 
Turati (2011e) describes a house, decorated by colorful paintings a block away 
from the now vandalized park. It used to be an abandoned house, but the members of 
the community rescued the property and founded in it a children’s library. As such it is 
used by the local children to do their homework, learn how to navigate the web and read. 
Additionally, the space has become a meeting point for the members of the community.  
Contreras tells the story of how the society claimed ownership over the process of 
reconstruction of the local social fabric:  
“The government promised many things, and since it did not delivered everything 
it promised, people became upset and decided: “Let us do it all ourselves.” They 
wanted to do a volleyball court, then some got excited and talked about building 
a local communal kitchen, but then they appropriated the abandoned house for 
the library. The bookcases were donated by a woman who used to own a 
bookstore, but went bankrupt because of the insecurity; the paint was donated by 
the owner of a hardware store that had been forced to close; some other 
neighbors working in the local maquiladoras for wood; and people provided the 
books.” (Turati, 2011e)  
 
Julian Contreras and other members of the community travelled to Cuernavaca 
for the first protest march and shared with others their experience of victimhood. The 
signing of the National Pact in Juarez represented not just the acknowledgement of the 
severity with which drug violence has punished this city, making it the world’s murder 
capital or the prospective future of the rest of the country if the militarization strategy is 
not changed, but rather the commitment of the city’s society and its resilience in the face 




IV. CONCLUSION: FROM VICTIMS TO VICTIMHOOD 
Since the implementation of the drug war national security strategy by President 
Calderon, Mexico has been embedded in a crisis. The high levels of drug related 
violence and its pervasiveness has forced people into the perceived safety of their 
homes, their private spaces. This retreat from public spaces inhibited the creation of a 
shared understanding of the social impact of the drug war. It was not until March 2011 
that public outrage associated with the drug related violence, the escalating human 
rights violations perpetrated by the military and the generalized perception of a 
systematic manipulation of the facts by the government, that people took back the 
streets articulating the MPJD. This movement’s emotional work articulated spaces of 
shared victimhood, setting the path for the victim’s pain to be collectivized and 
politicized. The present thesis aims to demonstrating how the MPJD member’s pain 
associated with their victimhood allowed for the articulation of these spaces mobilizing 
individualized stories of pain towards creating a collectivized experience of this emotion 
and ultimately founding a new political expression of victimhood. Through this process 
the MPJD also constructed a counter-narrative to the official narrative of victimhood, 
regaining ownership of over the narrative of their social reality and setting forward the 
foundations for the reconstruction of the shredded social fabric and the social pact.   
The current thesis has reviewed the process of the MPJD formation by exploring 
the protest events that took place right after the murder of Juan Francisco Sicilia in late 
March, 2011, the protest march from Cuernavaca to Mexico City and the first Caravan 
for Peace, exploring the exchange of personal narratives of victimhood along the way. It 
also looks at the emotional geographies of Juarez in its own particular logic, being not 
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just the city most severely affected by the drug war but also the first one that 
experienced the most rapid disarticulation of the social fabric, it was also the first one to 
find a way of constructing a space of shared victimhood and fostering a process of 
strengthening of social resilience.  
Because of the limited scope of this thesis, it was impossible to follow up the 
historical evolution and the geographical extension of the entirety of the process of the 
MPJD; however, the effective politization of the sense of shared pain has allowed 
Mexican society to push forward a new legal framework for victimhood. Additionally, the 
current work tried to limit its analysis to the emotional geographies constructed by the 
participants of the protest and mobilizations within the embryonic formation of the MPJD, 
without further exploring the complexities of its victimhood. In this sense, it has not 
explored victimhood associated with the Central American immigrants, the gendered 
aspect of drug related victimhood, the victimhood associated with Church activism 
against human rights violations and targeted violence against migrants, the different 
types of victimhood (direct or indirect). There is a lot to be done in terms of emotional 
geographies associated to the MPJD actions and the implications of the configuration of 
these spaces in the strengthening of society’s resilience. Since its foundation, the MPJD 
has organized at least 20 bus caravans throughout the national territory and one bus 






Table 1- High-profile cases involving civilian casualties in Mexico 2009-2011 
 
Date, Place and 
Reference/ Title in 
Media 
Description Official Reaction 
September 3rd, 2009 
(Juarez, Chihuahua) 
Attack to the 
Rehabilitation Center 
“Leyes de Reforma” 
The rehab center 
was attacked by an 
armed group, killing 
17 patients and 
critically wounding 
another 5.  
The state governor Jose Reyes Baeza 
Terrazas ordered the investigation of 63 
rehabilitation centers to look into the 
sources of their funding; the state minister 
for Public Security, Victor Valencia de los 
Santos announced that10 rehab centers 
were to be closed down to avoid further 
attacks; the state attorney Patricia 
Gonzalez Rodriguez stated that this 
attack is part of a war of extermination 
waged between criminal groups and that 
the rehab centers are used by the drug 
cartels as centers for distributing and 
dealing drugs as well as being refuge for 
people running away from the organized 
crime.  
December 22nd, 
2009  (Paraiso, 
Tabasco) 
Family members of a 
marine involved in 
bringing down one of 
the main drug lords 
are killed, due to 
lack of confidentiality 
of the government.  
At least four 
members of the 
extended family of 
Melquiades Angulo 
Córdova are gunned 
down by alleged 
members of the 
organized crime. 
The authorities 
never concealed the 
marine’s identity 
enabling retaliation 
of the cartels over 
the marine’s family. 
The state attorney of Tabasco, Rafael 
Miguel Gonzalez Lastra stated that the 
authorities will pursue the matter until the 
last consequences so that the crime does 
not go unpunished. He stated that it is 
clear that this is an act of revenge with 
the goal of intimidating not the 
government but Mexican society, so that 
they fear not just for their lives but also for 
their families’ as well. Additionally this 
may justify an escalation of violence of 
the war.  
January 31st, 2010 
(Juarez, Chihuahua)  
Massacre of 
Salvarcar Villas.  
14 young adults 
between the ages of 
15-20 are killed and 
at least another 14 
are critically 
wounded (three 
more would die from 
their wounds) when 
an armed group 
irrupted and open 
fire in an afterschool 
party in Juarez.   
Immediately after the killings and while in 
an official visit to Tokyo, Japan the 
Mexican president Felipe Calderon 
declared that the massacre was the result 
of a settling of scores between drug 
gangs. He later had to apologize to the 
parents for the statement. 
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March 19th, 2010 
(Monterrey, Nuevo 
Leon)  
Killing of Tec de 
Monterrey students 
Members of the 
military confronted 
an armed group in 
the grounds of the 
private university 
ITESM, where two 
students were 
caught in the 
crossfire and shot 
dead.  
The first official statements from the 
Nuevo Leon state attorney’s office about 
the killings claimed that the two casualties 
of the confrontation were two drug cartel 
enforcers and it was not until the parents 
of the students recognized the bodies that 
the casualties were civilians. It was later 
discovered that the bodies had been 
moved by the military from within the 
university grounds to the main avenue, 
that their student ID’s had been removed 
and that guns had been planted next to 
the bodies.  
June 10th, 2010 
(Chihuahua, 
Chihuahua)  
Attack to the 
Rehabilitation Center 
“Fe y Vida”. 
An armed group 
broke into the 
rehabilitation center 
killing 19 patients.  
The state attorney’s office of Chihuahua 
informed that members of the drug gang 
Los Mexicles were inside the rehab 
center, who along with the drug gang 
Killer Artists, fight along the Sinaloa drug 
cartel to control the drug trafficking within 
the state.  
July 18th, 2010 
(Torreon, Coahuila)  
Massacre of 
Torreon.  
17 people killed and 
9 are wounded at a 
birthday party in 
Torreon. The 
perpetrators were 
serving a sentence 
at the local prison 
however, got out and 
carried out the attack 
using vehicles, 
weapons and 
uniforms of the 
prison guards. After 
carrying out the 
attack they returned 
openly and freely to 
the prison.  
The General Attorney’s Office declared 
that regarding the facts of the massacre 
everything leads to the presumption of 
the attack being committed by members 
of the organized crime.  
 
August 22-23rd, 2010 
(San Fernando, 
Tamaulipas)  




South America are 
gunned down in the 
municipality of 
Huizache, the only 
survivor Freddy Lala 
denounces the 
massacre to the 
Mexican authorities.   
The General Attorney’s Office presented 
confusing and contradictory accounts of 
the massacre. Initially it declared that the 
executions were carried out by the Zetas 
because the immigrants refused to join 
their organization. It was later stated that 
the Zetas killed them because they 
confused them with members of other 
drug cartels. The official killing toll is now 
of 183, however some independent 
sources site at least 500 bodies.  
October 27th, 2010 
(Tepic, Nayarit) 
An armed group kills 
15 young adults that 
The attorney’s office for the state of 
Nayarit declared that presumed members 
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Massacre of October 
27th.  
were working at the 
carwash ‘Autolavado 
Gamboa’ in the 
neighborhood of Rey 
Nayar.  
of organized crime attacked a carwash 
located in the capital city of the state and 
killed at least 13 people. No further 





Attack to Tierras 
Coloradas 
Facing the 
intimidation of the 
local drug lords, the 
entire population of 
the town of Tierras 
Coloradas, all of 
them of indigenous 
origin, within the 
municipality of 
Mezquital, are forced 
to abandon their 
homes and seek 
refuge in the 
mountains. The town 
is later raided and 
the houses burnt to 
the ground by an 
armed group.  
The state attorney for Durango, Ramiro 
Ortiz, declared that the violence is spilling 
over and that nowadays the organized 
crime has no limits, no respect for 
families, civilians, women or children. The 
violence has turn the situation toward 
unexpected levels of brutality that the 
state cannot handle.  
April 1st, 2011 
(Juarez, Chihuahua)  
Shooting at a bar in 
Juarez. 
There is a shooting 
at a bar in Ciudad 
Juarez, Chihuahua 
where 10 people are 
killed. 
Authorities declared that they had little 
additional as to the motivation of the 
attack.  
April 6th, 2011 (San 
Fernando, 
Tamaulipas)  
Second Massacre of 
San Fernando 
177 bodies showing 
signs of execution 
style killing are 
discovered in San 
Fernando, the 
victims had been 
kidnapped days 
earlier from low cost 
buses.    
Confusion and contradictions remain, the 
government claims to have captured all 
the Zetas involved in the first massacre 
however, monetary rewards are still 
offered leading to the capture of more 
people related to the killings, the first 
round of arrests in relation to the second 
massacre led suspects arrested and then 
released in relation to the first massacre.  
 
April 21st, 2011 
(Victoria de 
Durango, Durango)  
Massacre of 
Durango 




249-340 bodies, no 
official number has 
been disclosed.  
The state attorney’s office of Durango 
declared that he could not disclose any 
information regarding any arrests or leads 
concerning the mass graves found in 
Durango because this would compromise 
the investigations.  
 
April 28th, 2011 
(Temixco, Morelos)  
Killing of Juan 
Francisco Sicilia 
Ortega 
The police find the 
bodies of seven 
individuals including 
that of Juan 
Francisco Sicilia 
The General Attorney’s Office declared 
after a series of inconsistencies on the 
declarations regarding the killings, that it 
had received the order of not giving any 
further updates in the case. The media 
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Ortega, son of 
Mexican poet and 
political analyst 
Javier Sicilia.  
speculated that this was because Javier 
Sicilia’s son was one of the victims. The 
initial statements from this office declared 
that the victims were not related, later 
declarations stated that only five of them 
knew each other but that neither Juan 
Francisco Sicilia nor Jesus Chavez 
Vazquez belonged to this group. 
However, family and friends contradicted 
this narrative.  
June 7th, 2011 
(Torreon, Coahuila)  
Attack to the 
Rehabilitation Center 
“La Victoria” 
The rehab center 
was attacked by an 
armed group, killing 
13 patients.  
According to the first official statements 
from the state attorney’s office, the attack 
was conducted by armed groups that 
traveled in five vans and after the attacks 
there was a persecution and shooting in 
Reforma Blvd. related to the rehab attack. 
No further information was provided.  













number of Central 
American 
immigrants are 
kidnapped from the 
train in which they 
were traveling from 
the state of Oaxaca 
to Veracruz.  
The General Attorney’s Office announced 
that it has opened to investigations for 
kidnapping, after the public statement of 
Alejandro Solalinde denouncing that 
somewhere between 80 and 100 Central 
American immigrants had been 
kidnapped by what now is presumed to 
be a criminal group of the Zetas. He also 
stated that the narrative of the events 
states that at least 10 armed individuals 
driving luxurious vans had intercepted the 
train and forced the people out of it and 
into the vans.   
July 7th, 2011 
(Apatzingán, Nueva 
Italia, Zinapécuaro, 
Úspero and Morelia, 
Michoacan)  
Series of Narco-
blockades   
Groups of the 
organized crime 
conducted a series 
of blockades through 
these cities, 
obstructing and 
closing down the 
main roads and 
resulting in open 
confrontation 
between the drug 
cartels and the 
police.   
Little was stated by the authorities, just 
that the actions were caused by a 
confrontation with groups of the 
organized crime motivated by the 
retaliation against a strategic action 
carried out by the federal police in 
Apatzingan. After several hours the 
federal police declared that they had the 
situation under control.  
July 9th, 2011 
(Torreon, Coahuila)  
10 decapitated 
bodies are found in a 
vehicle 
The bodies of 10 
individuals, three 
women and seven 
men were found 
decapitated inside a 
van while their 
heads were found 
The official statements reported that the 
bodies were found decapitated and left on 
the street scattered throughout the city, 
additionally a vehicle was located which 
contained the beheaded bodies of 10 
individuals along with a narco-message 
which content was not revealed by the 
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scattered around the 
city with narco-
messages.  
police. The identity of the victims 
remained unknown.  
July 26th, 2011 
(Boca del Rio, 
Veracruz)  
Killing of Yolanda 
Ordaz 
The journalist 
Yolanda Ordaz is 
killed.  
The authorities denied that the death of 
the journalist was related to her line of 
work, suggesting that the motivation may 
be linked to links to organized crime.  





At least 52 people 
are killed in an 
attack with hand 
grenades that 
produces a fire in a 
casino in Monterrey.   
Official statements declared that the 
attack on the casino were motivated by a 
disagreement between the criminal group 
of the Zetas and the owner of the 
business who refused to pay the weekly 
“right to floor” fee of 130 000 pesos 
demanded by the Zetas.  
September 20th, 
2011 (Boca del Rio, 
Veracruz)  
First Massacre in 
Boca del Rio 
35 bodies are 
abandoned in Boca 
del Rio, within them 
the bodies of two 
minors a 17 and a 
15 year-old were 
found.  
There were contradictions and 
confrontations regarding the narrative of 
the massacre between the federal and 
the local attorney’s offices. The speaker 
for the federal government regarding 
issues of Security, Alejandra de la Sota 
denied the version of the Veracruz 
attorney, Reynaldo Escobar Perez in 
which he stated that the all the victims 
had a criminal record. Additionally, the 
state governor, Javier Duarte published in 
his twitter account that though the killings 
of 35 people was a tragedy, it was more 
of a tragedy that those people devoted 
their lives to killing, kidnapping and 
extorting money. The state attorney 
declared within hours of the findings that 
all of the bodies had been identified and 
that all of them were related to the 
organized crime.  
September 23rd, 
2011 (Veracruz and 
Boca del Rio, 
Veracruz) 
Second Massacre in 
Boca del Rio  
14 bodies were 
scattered throughout 
the cities of Veracruz 
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